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CONSTITUTIONAL AND GENERAL WELFARE
CONSIDERATIONS IN EFFORTS TO ZONE OUT
PRIVATE SCHOOLS*
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ**

Reccnt litigation in state courts involving efforts on the part of governmental bodies to zone out private schools1 raises qucstions of importance
for both private schools and for parents who wish to select the type of
institution their children attend.
This article will discuss the zoning regulatioiis from the viewpoint of

the due process and equal protection of the laws provisions of the United
States Constitution. The fact that a zoning out of a private school case,
on appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, was dismissed by per
curiam decision- by the Supreme Court in 1955 as not involving a federal
question is not a bar to such treatment. In the \Visconsin litigation, it
appears that the favorable outcome at the trial stage and the strong precedent in other states3' induced those interested in the private school rights
not to present in the state court, the strongest possible arguments to establish that there was a federal question. There do seem to exist reasons which
could convince the Supreme Court that there is a real fourteenth amendment issue raised by efforts to zone out private schools.
The importance of testing state or municipal zoning efforts against
the Federal Constitution is spotlighted by McQuillin's comment that "in
investigating the constitutional validity of zoning laws, in view of the provisions of the United States Constitution, it should be said ...that it is not
important whether the power to enact them emanates from the state constitution, or state statutes, or the municipal charter, because the state cannot
violate the United States Constitution by its own constitution, hence it
*This article deals only with efforts to zone out elementary and secondary schools.

**Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A. 1929,
Notre Dame Univ.; M.A. 1932, Northwestern Univ.; L.L.B. 1935, Creighton Univ.;
Formerly assistant professor of law, Creighton University; assistant to the superintendent
of public schools in Omaha and in St. Louis; senior attorney, National Labor Relations
Board, Washington, D.C.; labor relations attorney, Montgomery \Ward and Compauy,

Chicago; executive, Chicago Daily News; director, Chicago Division, Medill School of
Journalism, Northwestern University; associate professor, labor law, law of the press,
and school law at Northwestern University; frequent contributor to legal periodicals.
I. Wisconsin ex rel. Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 'Wis. 91,
65 N.W.2d 43 (1954); Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45
Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955); Great Neck Community School v. Dick, 140 N.Y.S.2d
221 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board of ''own of Breighton,
207 Misc. 1021, 141 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1955). (The New York cases are on
appeal to the Appellate Division). In the latter part of 1955 the court in Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania, upheld a zoning ban against a private high school.

2.349 U.S. 913 (1954).
3. References are made to the cases later in this article.
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cannot by its constitution repeal, modify or suspend the due process of law
clauses or the guarantees of personal and property rights contained in the
. . . fourteenth amendment."4
In considering the impact of due process on zoning legislation directed
against private schools, it appears that the liberties involved are these: (1)
that of parents to select the type of education they desire for their children
and (2) that of a private school corporation to use property which it owns
for educational purposes.
A decision of the United States Supreme Court clearly indicates the
concern which the Court has for the liberties just mentioned. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 said of the
parents' right, "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligation." On
the matter of the safeguarding of the property interest, McReynolds answered the contention that the Society of Sisters was a corporation and
could not claim for itself the liberty which the fourteenth amendment guarantees by the blunt statement that appellees "have business and property
for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over
present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone
very far to protect against loss threatened by such action."
So emphatic is the language of the Society of Sisters case on the matter of rights of parents that it might almost induce the belief that it gives
the answer, without need of further discussion, to the extent of the power
of government to zone out private schools. Actually it does not. The
court was faced with an Oregon statute which attempted to force all children to attend the public schools of the state. Zoning ordinances relating
to private schools do not directly make such effort.
Discussion will, therefore, later return to the effect which the zoning
ordinances have on rights of parents to select private school education for
their children.
In respect to the protection of property rights, Pierce v. Society of Sisters need not stand alone as precedent. The United States Supreme Court
has shown its respect for due process in zoning by pointing out that "the
governmental power to interfere by zoning regulation with the general rights
4. McQuillin, Constitutional Validity of Zoning Under the Police Power, 11

Louis L. REV. 76, 77 (1926).
5. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
6. Id.at 535.

ST.
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of the landowner by restricting the character of his use is not unlimited,
and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does
not bear a substantial relation td the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." 7
The Court, while recognizing that zoning power is grounded upon the
police power of the state, showed awareness that there must be a balancing
against property rights whenever the police power is exercised.
The attitude suggests that before the private school can be zoned out
there must be found values of major importance to general welfare when
compared with those that inhere in the use of property for a private school.
Obvious values which come to mind are aesthetic and property ones. That
the protection of such values comes within the police power of the state can
be implied from the United States Supreme Court's acknowledgment that
"the police power of the state embraces regulation designed to promote
public convenience or general prosperity as well as regulation designed to
promote the health, the public morals or the public safety." Professor
Sayre of the University of Iowa Law School forcefully contends that aesthetics goes toward maintaining property values and that the advantage of

property values should be considered an instance of public welfare." 9
"Property," he points out, "is one way in which we measure the general
well being of the entire city or neighborhood. . . .Without wealth in this
sense . . . from which taxes may come," he continues, "the city cannot main-

tain the obvious public welfare through sewers and other sanitation equipment, public parks, public schools, protection against epidemics and the
control of lawlessness, all of which directly contribute to health, morals and
safety."' 0 A number of courts have construed "general welfare" to include
the preservation of property values.1
The recognition that the police power of state and municipal governments can be exerted to guard aesthetic and property values in no way
resolves the question as to whether those values are significant enough to be
protected ahead of the value which results from the use of property for a
private school and the value which arises out of such use. An answer will
come only after the most careful balancing. Professor Sayre argues that
"the real test is whether the police power is justly used to protect the public interest in private property and not merely the selfish advantage of the
7. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). Johnson, Constitu-

tional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 199, 200 (1955)
comments that the Nectow case has never been overruled or disapproved and could lead
to future decisions adverse to planning.
8. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
9. Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
10. Id. at 472.
11. See cases cited by Radda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes. Under
the Police Power, 27 So. CALIF. L. REv. 149, 153, n.- 30 (1954) .'- - :
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individual owner."'12 Significantly, he thinks in terms of benefit to the
whole community "though the individual owner may lose.' 3 The United
States Supreme Court warns that "the validity of a police regulation,
whether established directly by the state, or by some public body acting
under its sanction, must depend upon the circumstances of each case and
the character of the regulation, whether arbitrary or unreasonable and
whether really designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose." 4 In
the course of such evaluation, cognizance can also be taken of the fact that
in many instances the existence of private schools in a community have
increased property values as a whole.
No court has undertaken the task of doing the evaluation suggested.
The one court of last resort which has upheld a zoning ordinance directed
at private schools does talk about the contribution which such schools make
to general welfare, but it does so for the purpose of establishing no violation of the equal protection of the laws principle. Faced with an ordinance which permitted public schools but zoned out private schools, the
Wisconsin court in the Lutheran High School' 5 case discussed the contribution of a private high school to general welfare in order to support its
finding that there was a reasonable classification'" and that the ordinance
was valid. In answer to the assertion of the Wisconsin Lutheran High
School Conference that discrimination was involved in the provision which
permitted the erection of a public high school in Residence Area A' 7 of
Wauwatosa but banned the building of a private high school, the court
turned the argument and informed the Lutheran group that the zoning
ordinance was based on a valid classification. In spelling out its position
the court pointed out that the private school discriminates in its admission
policies and, therefore, does not serve the public welfare to the same degree
as the public school.
This attitude on the part of the court warrants rather lengthy analysis. It seems to indicate a rather unrealistic approach to a determination
of the contribution of private schools to general welfare. The analysis should
indicate that any ordinance which discriminates between public and private
schools can properly be attacked on the ground of violation of equal protection of the laws for want of reasonable classification.' Argument which
12. Sayre, supra note 9, at 474.
13. Sayre, supra note 9, at 529.
14. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
15. Wisconsin ex rel. Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91,
65 N.W.2d 43 (1954).
16. The significance of legislative classification is brought out in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). See also Johnson, supra note 7, at 199.
17. The most select residence area in Wauwatosa, a suburb immediately adjacent
to Milwaukee.
18. ROTTrSCAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 551 (1939) draws attention to the
general rule that equal protection of the laws requires states to make reasonable
classifications in enacting and enforcing regulatory legislation and that the reasonableness
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portrays the importance of the contribution of the private school should
also help to spotlight the difficulty of any direct determination that specific
aesthetic and property value are greatly important to general welfare when
compared with the contribution made by tile private school.
Turning to the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,' it appears
that the court introduced a test for "general welfare" which might be called
a numerical test. It was a test especially designed for the problem at hand.
Tile court stated that since tile private school discriminates in its admission policies, it does not serve the public welfare to the same degree as the
20
public school.
A reaction to this test requires thoughtful analysis of the court's accusation that the private school is guilty of discrimination.
Since the record did not reveal any indication that the Lutheran High
School would practice any technique of exclusion which could be characterized as bigotted, arbitrary or unreasonable, it is apparent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court must have had in mind another test for discrimination. Perhaps it presumed that the school would limit its enrollment to
Lutherans. More clearly it was merely thinking in terms of total numbers. Because the court may have thought that most private schools could
not physically accommodate the numbers which a public school could accept, the court apparently felt it did not need to worry about lack of concrete evidence of discrimination. It saw in the existing situation an attitude which it referred to as one of discrimination.
A holding that private schools generally would not admit all comers,
cannot be challenged. This might be for a number of reasons.
Since the private school does not have access to the tax dollar, it is
forced to charge tuition and to select most of its students on the basis of
ability to pay. Also, lack of tax support so limits the capacity to build a
plant that space facilities force registration curtailment.
Since space is limited the private school must as a practical matter
give preference to the group that contributes major support. In the case
of the religious private school this usually means a particular faith.
of a classification can be determined only by considering its purpose, the policy to be
promoted thereby, and the relation of the resulting differences in treatment to those
factors.
In thinking of the impact of equal protection of the laws upon the problem at
hand it is proper to think of Frank's comment at page 405 of his Constitutional Law
(1952) that ". . . if the same amount of ingenuity and determination that went
into the judicial expansion of the due process clause had been focused on the equal
protection clause, many of the same results could have been reached." It would seem
that many of the arguments in this article which question due process can also be
used in testing for equal protection of the laws.
19. 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954).
20. The court admitted that there was no difference between a public school
and a private school in respect to the affect on health, safety, or morals. Id at 96,
65 N.W.2d at 47.
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It must be admitted, also, that the private school has more power than
the public school to select enrollment on the basis of mental qualification,
character qualification and conformity with the ideals of the school.
Do these facts support a conclusion of discrimination? Yes, in the
sense that all acts involving a selection are acts of discrimination. But do
the facts constitute a policy of unjustifiable selection which is based upon
an arbitrary, unreasonable or an otherwise undesirable standard? No, seems
the logical answer.
A decision upon admission policies which is dictated by financial resources certainly involves no conduct which should be censured. A private
school cannot be blamed for not using tax money which the law of the
state denies it.
Does enrollment policy become more vulnerable to the charge of discrimination if students are chosen on the basis of academic qualifications,
character qualifications and conformity with the ideals of the school? It
would seem the answer should be in the negative unless there is no reasonable justification for such determination.
It is submitted that there is a reasonable justification. Certainly the
nation has an interest in any efforts at providing a good atmosphere for the
education of students who have the capacity to absorb training in future
leadership. Decisions on the part of a private school to set up scholastic
standards can reasonably be justified as a technique for creating a favorable climate for the efficient development of leadership qualities in those
pupils with the requisite mental abilities. Decisions so made represent an
educational philosophy and not a philosophy of discrimination. That there
is an educational philosophy which indicates that good results can be expected from homogeneous grouping is clearly evident in the writing of
Ward Reeder in his book, The Fundamentals of Public School Administration. It is there stated that "the aim of teachers and school officials should
be to group together those pupils who have nearly similar abilities. Such
grouping makes it much easier for the teacher to adapt his material and
methods to the group." 21 Leonard Koos, in his volume The American Secondary School, indicates that "homogeneous grouping is one means of adapting the curriculum toward keeping the better-than-average pupil working at
full level of ability." 22 While it is true that some educators believe that
the teacher can enrich the curriculum for the above-average child without
the need of homogeneous grouping, 23 the belief does not destroy the fact
21. Pages 340-41. On the same pages the author refers to experiments which
indicate that pupils do their best work when grouped with other pupils of similar
ability.
22. Page 544.
23. Paul Witty, Professor of Education at the School of Education, Northwestern
University, has been one of the most forceful proponents of such thinking as his
numerous books and articles reveal.
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that such grouping can be reasonably used as a technique to serve the aboveaverage pupil. And since the private school can in no event, as has previously been shown in this article, admit unlimited numbers, any decision
to think primarily of the training of the youths who will most likely develop qualities for future leadership is a reasonable decision free from motives of discrimination. In this connection it is interesting to note the comment of Professor Arch 0. Heck, College of Education, Ohio State University.
The danger of universal public education is leveling of a nation's leadership. The task of providing it is so great that children
are handled en masse. Instruction lacks individualization because
the course of study is developed to fit the average child. The more
4
nearly education is made universal the lower is that average.2
If there is something unreasonable about setting up mental ability
qualifications as a criterion for admission then many of our law, medical,
dental, engineering, journalism, commerce and other university schools have
been guilty of acts of discrimination which can be censured. The censure,
however, has not been administered. Rather a sizable and responsible portion of the public feels that the schools are performing a useful service in
creating an educational climate which is not affected by the presence of the
inept.
True, it is possible to feel that selection policies at the university level
should be stricter than at the secondary school level. But it still seems that
the private school is not acting unreasonably if it makes certain admission
decisions by using a yardstick which measures ability. And if it does not
act unreasonably, it is difficult to understand why it should be accused of
an act of discrimination.
It is often true that the public school provides for differences in mental
capacity by means of homogeneous grouping and setting up of varied programs. This would seem to confirm the conclusion that any effort of the
private school at selection on the basis of capacity to absorb is educationally justified and not in any way a manifestation of an improper preference.
As respects the private elementary school there is much less likelihood
that many of them will do much choosing on the basis of scholastic standards. In actual practice it will probably reject only the hopelessly incompetent. A particular public school may do the same.
Since private schools often give attention to character qualifications
and insist upon a degree of conformity with the ideals of the school, it becomes pertinent to analyze the reasonableness of such attitude.
24. HECK, TimE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN

374 (1953).
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Certainly the efforts of universities to inquire into character as part
of admission practice arc generally approved. Why then should a somewhat similar approach be labeled as in any way wrong if it is used by the
private secondary or elementary school? Reputable educators believe that
the presence of students with some clearly recognized character deficiencies
can have a marked effect upon tie morale of a school with the result that an
atmosphere is created which is not the most conducive to best educational
results.25 The attitude of these professional people has nothing to do with
a desire to discriminate.
The attention which a private school gives to conformity with ideals
of the school would seem to be discriminatory only if the ideals set up are
in some way unlawful or undemocratic.
It would appear perfectly proper for a private school to refuse admission to one whose weakness of character was evidenced by a record of acts
of dishonesty or moral turpitude. Even public schools often take recognition of such conduct. Pupils who have transgressed civil and moral laws
frequently are rejected by one public school and required to transfer to
another school. Under certain circumstances pupils are sent to a school of
correction. No one looks upon rejection under such conditions as indicating any kind of bias. Rather it is thought of as a procedure necessary
to safeguard the morale of the individual school and the educational welfare
of those who attend.
Many private schools are operated by religious denominations. On occasion a school of such type may reject a student who is openly antagonistic
to the faith represented by the school administration. It might possibly
be contended that such action is biased. Reflection, however, leads to the
thought that such open defiance on the part of a student would have a
25. The writer is not able to allude to published statements which directly support
the assertion, and he is not authorized to use names in connection with quotations.
From personal experience he is able to testify that many highly respected public
school administrators have voiced the opinion indicated. Recently the Dean of the
School of Education at one of the country's great universities (non-denominational)
gave the opinion that compulsory attendance laws should be revised so that many
persons with certain character deficiencies would not need to be retained in the public
schools. The same opinion was expressed openly by a secondary school principal at
the Secondary School Principals meeting held in Chicago in the late winter of 1956.
The fact already exists that students are by administrative action often shifted from
one public school to another because character deficiencies have created a morale
problem which endangers educational results. Professor Arch 0. Heck at page 59 of
his book The Education of Exceptional Children, supra note 24, makes a comment

which has some pertinence. lie says,
"Give youth a chance" is a modem slogan in dealing with the socially
handicapped; there comes a time, however, when we have to say "Give
society a chance." When all fails to change the individual's mode of
response and

when

that

mode of response begins

to have

a

decidedly

detrimental effect upon other individuals, society must demand for its own
sake that the youth be incarcerated.

Professor Heck goes on to indicate that he is using the term "socially handicapped"
to mean delinquent. He also explains that lie is not using "incarcerated" to mean
jailed, but placement in a specific kind of school.
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disturbing effect upon the atmosphere within a school and that it would
be educationally sound to reject those who are responsible for such disturbance.
As long as the school does not hold to ideals which are undemocratic
or unlawful, rejection of students openly antagonistic to its ideals is certainly not discriminatory. It is merely a frank recognition that education
cannot flourish best in a climate of disharmony. As a matter of fact, if
pupils within a public school openly attacked and ridiculed the religious
beliefs of other pupils, the offenders could be silenced and expelled if they
persisted in such tactics. No school, public or private, should be a forum
for such endeavor.
The impression may exist that private schools run by a religious denomination refuse to admit all who do not belong to the faith of the group
that administers the institution. This may seem to be a proper deduction
from observing that the largest segment of enrollment belongs to the faith
of the group in control of operation.
Actually, the situation does not connote discrimination. The result
does not come about from a desire not to accept members of other faiths.
It exists because of the practical facts which confront the private school.
As already noted the private school does not have access to the tax dollar
and, consequently, is limited iu respect to the physical plant it can build
and staff with teachers. It is only logical that private schools give preference to members of those groups who contribute the support which insures
operation.
Certainly the vast majority of religious schools would like to accept
students of all faiths (as long as they are not openly antagonistic to the
faith of the administration). The writer knows of no religiously controlled
institution which has a rule that requires it to reject students simply on the
grounds of religious belief.
The fact that religiously dominated private schools want to, and do,
accept students of all faiths becomes apparent when we look at college and
university operations as they have existed to the present time. At such
level in a great many private institutions space is not at the same premium
as it is in the elementary and secondary field. As a result Protestants and
Jews in considerable numbers are found on Catholic school Campuses. Episcopalians, Lutherans and Jews are found on campuses operated by Methodists. Almost any combination of religious sects are found at a large number of religiously controlled private institutions of higher learning.
Indeed, to the extent that space limitations permit, students of varied
faiths are found at elementary and secondary schools operated by religious
bodies. Thcre is, in short, no fixed policy of discrimination. Certainly
no improper preference can be deduced from the fact that a religious school
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will almost always draw the heaviest proportion of its enrollnent from the
faith in control of operations.
The entire discussion bearing upon the question of whether admission
policies of private schools constitute discrimination should focus attention
upon the fact that discrimination is a word which bears watching. The only
important consideration is whether there is unreasonable exclusion. It would
seem that selection policies should not be censored unless admission practices constitute unfair, bigotted or undemocratic acts.
The accuracy of this concept of discrimination will become even more
apparent after brief analysis. Certainly those who have worked in the interests
of fair employment practices have been keenly conscious of problems of
improper preference. And yet in none of the fifteen states where the legislature has passed fair employment practice acts is there a condemnation of
employers on any kind of a number employed basis. The legislators clearly
avoided requiring an employer to hire on a percentage basis equal to the
ratio of a particular race, color or creed found in the community. The fair
employment practice acts recognize that a failure to hire based upon such
reasonable grounds as lack of skill, temperament, personality and character is reasonable. They strike out at failure to hire which is based upon an
attitude of prejudice Congress in connection with its passage of the antidiscrimination features of the Robinson-Patman Act showed clearly a desire
to protect free competition. And yet it did not halt the seller from granting price differentials if it was necessary to meet the price of a competitor
or if it was based upon a cost difference. In other words action taken
which is reasonable was distinguished from that which is clearly discriminatory. The United States Supreme Court in 1945 refused to use a num6
bers test in considering a question of discrimination. In Adkins v. Texas
the court specifically stated that there was no wrongful selection of a
grand jury on the ground of mere inequality in the number of persons selected from the different races. The court commented that discrimination
is unlawful only if it is purposeful and systematic.
But even if such is the conclusion as respects the meaning of discrimination the fact remains that the public school will frequently serve more
pupils than the private school. Is it possible, therefore, to conclude that
the public school serves the general welfare to a greater extent than the
private school? Is it sound to evaluate "general welfare" by a mere counting of numbers test? It is submitted that the answer should be in the
negative.
Fundamentally and essentially the test of the value of education in
serving the general welfare must be on the basis of success with each individual product. If comparison is made between individuals of equal men26. 325 U.S. 398 (1944).
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tal capacity, personality and character attending schools of equal rating,
it is utterly impossible to conclude that boys and girls educated in a public
school would make a greater contribution to general welfare than those educated in a private school. Both groups should make a tremendous contribution- one so significant that itis impossible to weigh with any human
yardstick. Government should not put any obstacle in the path of an institution capable of doing so much good. In their book2 7 Johnson and Yost
remind us that from the private schools "have come many of the leaders
in educational reform and many of our greatest statesmen .... It can hardly

be said," they say, "that these institutions have been a detriment; rather
they have been an asset." 2
The court should not determine that because the public schools can
turn out more products than the private schools they, therefore, do more
good.
The only valid test of educational results is one that is qualitative.
One will not be attempted in this article, and it probably may be that as a
practical matter none could be universally or generally applied. It would
be difficult to make allowances for variations due to differing lawful objectives. It would be very undesirable to force all schools into a completely
standardized mold.
Evaluation under a qualitative standard would actually require comparison on an individual school basis - perhaps on an individual teacher
basis. The critic would be rash, indeed, who would claim either that all
public education is better than private or that all private education is better than public.
At any rate the courts are not competent or equipped to make a comparison between public and private schools.
One other argument which the Wisconsin Court used to bolster its
position gives further support to the feeling that the court did not adopt
the most realistic attitude toward the evaluation of the contribution which
the private school makes to general welfare. This is the argument by
analogy to cases which upheld zoning out of privately owned parks and
playgrounds, a privately owned golf driving range, and a wholesale and retail
milk business. 2
A number of state courts of final appeal have recognized very clearly
the contribution which the private school makes to general welfare. The
Illinois court said, "Such a school [private], conducted in accordance with
the educational requirements established by the state educational authori27.
STATES

JOHNSON

(1948).

AND

Yosr,

SEPARATION
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28. Id. at 140.
29. 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43, 47-48 (1954).
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STATE
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tics, is promotive of the general welfarc. "' rThe Supreme Court of Oregon
commented that "the kind of school [private] to be erected will not interfere with the public health, it cannot affect public peace, it surely will
not endanger public safety and by all civilized people an educational institution whose curriculum complies with the state law is considered an aid
to the general welfare."'"
In the most recent case, 32 decided in the latter part of November 1955,
the Supreme Court of California reviewed a great number of the cases
which involved attempts to zone out private schools (including that of
Wauwatosa, Wisconsin) and concluded that the Piedmont ordinance was
void because of its arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against private
schools. The court very evidently recognized that the private school did
not make any less contribution to general welfare than did the public school.
Enough has perhaps been set forth concerning the contribution of the
private school to general welfare. It is submitted that the contribution is
significant enough to protect the property rights of the private school against
zoning efforts.
It is now further submitted that the right of parents to select the kind
of instruction they wish for their children furnishes another strong reason
for invalidating zoning ordinances aimed at private schools.
The presentation of this viewpoint will carry the reader back to earlier
comments made in this article about due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and to the United States Supreme Court statement in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.33
Previously this article dropped discussion on parent's rights with the
reasoning that a zoning ordinance is not likely to keep a private school
completely out of a city, village, or county and, therefore, is unlike the
Oregon ordinance involved in the Society of Sisters case which attempted
to outlaw private schools. Now it is pertinent to think about the extent
to which zoning ordinances directed at private schools do affect rights
of parents.
Basic to any thinking on the problem is the need to understand that
a zoning ordinance may endeavor to keep out private schools from 98%
of the city as was the situation in the Piedmont, California, effort or it may
30. Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 259-60, 20 N.E.2d 584 (1939).
This case and Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537 (1937)
are the two cases which the Wisconsin Supreme Court admitted were practically
identical with the facts involved in the Lutheran High School zoning controversy. See
36 A.L.R.2d 657-660 for citation to and discussion of other cases holding zoning
ordinances directed at private schools invalid.
31. Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 613, 15 P.2d 391,
395 (1932).
32. Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal.2d 32, 289
P.2d 438 (1955).

33. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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be aimed at the private school in a nuch smaller area as was the fact in
the Vauwatosa, Wisconsin, situation.
Very clearly there appears to be a due process violation in the 98%
attempt. just as clearly there would seem to be a violation in a 73o/%ordinance. Indeed facts could plainly show a violation in an ordinance where
the percentage was appreciably lower than 75%.
The fault in the 98% and 75% legislation is that the private school
can be pushed back to a very undesirable manufacturing, commercial or
economic area. Facts might establish that even smaller percentage provisions might induce such results.:" The result would seriously affect rights
of parents. They would be coerced into enrolling their children in a public
school in order to avoid sending them into regions where the health, safety
and moral hazards may be high.
Various courts have seen the indicated danger when attempts have
been made to zone out churches. In State ex rel United Lutheran Church
v. Joseph 5" the court remark-ed that "to require that churches be banished
to the business district, crowded alongside filling stations and grocery stores,
is clearly not to be justified on the score of promoting general welfare."
In City of Sherman v, Sims
5 a the Texas court warned that "to relegate
churches to public and manufacturing districts could conceivably result in
imposing a burden upon the free right to worship and in some instances
in prohibiting altogether the exercise of that right."
The same result can follow if the philosophy of the Lutheran High
School case is followed.
The fault in an ordinance of the Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, type which
is designed to keep private schools out of a relatively small area within a
city is that it constitutes a real threat to parents' rights when it is supported
by a judicial finding that the private school does not make as much of a
contribution to public welfare as does the public school. The threat exists
because of the very real pressure which is likely to come from neighboring
residence areas to have their legislative bodies give them zoning which
restricts the private school. A commentator in a recent issue of the Harvard
Law Review indicates that the threat is real. "Perhaps," he says, "the most
harmful tendency of ...restrictive ordinances would be to stimulate pro-

tective movements on the part of neighboring communities." 17 A court
which followed the doctrine of the Lutheran H-igh School case could not
34. -IoRAcK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CoNTRoLS (1955) at page 47 brings out
the appropriateness of testing the application of a zoning ordinance to specific tracts
or Uses.
35. 139 Ohio St. 229, 249, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942).
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Tampa, 48 So.2d 78 (la. 1950).
36, 143 Texas 115, 183 S.W,2d 415 (1944).
37. 67 1lAv. L. Rav. 922 (1954).

See also State ex rel.
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halt the trend because its numerical numbers test would be applicable
throughout all areas to which zoning might have application.
Often there is a contention which stems from the observation that a
private school sometimes draws a number of its pupils from across boundaries allocated to a particular public school district. It is claimed that a
specific community is within its rights in prohibiting the erection of a
school which is intended to draw a sizable proportion of out-of-area pupils.
A very narrow construction of the law might induce the holding that
the conmmunity could keep the private school on a plane of exact equality
with the public school as respects territory serv'cd. If, however, there is
validity to the points made earlier in this article-that the private school
makes a contribution to general welfare of equal significance to that of the
public school and that it is desirable in a democracy to permit both public
and private schools to flourish-such will not be the conclusion.
Because of some of the practical considcrations mentioned previously
in this discussion it cannot be expected that private schools can always be
erected to serve the same geographical areas as the public school. Rights of
parents who live in a particular district in which there is no private school
should not suffer from any rule which would prevent them from selecting
a private school in an adjacent region.
In this connection it is of significance to realize that a number of
statutes provide for the transfer of public school pupils from one district
to another for the purposes of school attcndance : This is particularly
true where one district has a high school and the other has not. Of course,
provision is made for the home district to hear the financial burden of
the transfer.
Since so much emphasis has been put upon rights of parents to send
their children to private schools it seems appropriate before going on with
the article to indicate that there are logical reasons which induce parents
to exercise their rights.
One of the most important reasons for selection of a private school is
the desire to insure that the child will get proper religious instruction.
Millions of parents feel that knowledge of God and of fundamental principles of morals and ethics is more basic and necessarv than anv other
learning.:"' They feel keenly that much of the trouble in the world today
stems from an over-emphasis upon secular and purely material goals. rhey
believe with Edward S. Corwin, long time professor of Jurisprudence at
Princeton University and one of the foremost constitutional authorities,
AND Til, Punic Sciioo.s 334-3i (rev. ed. 1955).
school educator is today aware of the need of introducing
some religious concepts into the curriculum.
As evidence, see the April 1955 issue
of Phi Delta Kappa (a journal of research, service and leadership in education) devoted
to Religion in Education.

38. EDnvAns, 'I'HE CO;RTS

39. Even the

public
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that "primarily democracy is a system of ethical values, and that this system
of values so far as the Americai people are concerned is grounded in religion." 40 Since the law places restraints upon the public school in respect
to teaching religion the parents turn to the religiously controlled private
school.
It is important to realize that when parents make this selection they
are not thereby choosing a curriculum which does not meet with state

approval 41 In order to operate, private schools should and do meet state
standards. They must teach certain subjects plainly essential to good citizenship. Indeed, a strong case can be made for the position that private schools
enrich the curriculum in citizenship by adding religion to courses normally
taught by the public school.
Other motivations prompting choice of a private school might be the
feeling that a small school atmosphere has benefits which cannot be found
in a large school-au interest in small classes; a desire that the child be
given more personalized, individual attention; a belief that admission policies
that take cognizance of mental ability result in a desirable atmosphere; and
a preference for an exclusive boys or girls school. None of these motivations
are in any way unlawful. Actually, in this country it would seem totally
42
undesirable to unite all children into a standardized democratic mass.

One argument was presented by the dissenters in the Piedmont case
which is designed to answer the contention that an ordinance which closes

98% of a city to private schools is invalid. They comment that it was not
"established as a fact that there are no adequate areas in which private

schools may be built which would be reasonably accessible to residents of
the city of Piedmont."'' They go on to indicate that boys and girls in
Piedmont could easily go to private schools in the city of Oakland, California.
At first thought this argument appears to have some appeal but it
overlooks the fact that private school groups have a right to have their
property interests protected. Actually such an attitude makes it most difficult
for a private school administrator to do intelligent planning. It would be
a hardship to require an administrator to delay the purchase of property
or the start of a building program until he was told by a private school in a
neighboring community that there is no more room for out-of-area pupils.
Since the law frowns on discrimination in zoning ordinances the private
school administrator should have the same freedom to buy property with
40. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CON'rmiP.
PROB. 3, 21 (1949). On the same page the author indicates the need for religious

instruction in the schools.
41. For a discussion of certain state standards see Seitz, Supervision of Public
Elementary and Secondary School Pupils Through State Control Over Curriculum and
Textbook Selection, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. Pion, 104 (1955).
42. For the danger involved see Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. 23, 37 (1947).
43. 45 Cal.2d 325, 338, 289 P.2d 438, 446 (1955).
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assurance it can be used as does the public school board of education. The
private school administrator should have the right to use that property
whenever expediency dictates.
There remains to be analyzed another argument of the dissenters in
the Piedmont decision. The justices contended that if the city was compelled to allow the petitioner's private school to be built, it must permit
all private schools to enter unless the court is prepared to examine and
censor or itself prescribe the projected curriculum.44 To picture the effect
of granting such general permission the dissenters refer to the existence of
driving, language, mechanical arts, bartending, nursery, secretarial, televi45
sion, dancing, and culture schools.
Few would assert that all the kinds of schools which the dissenters
enumerate have a right of entry into all types of areas. Since all the institutions named by the dissenters on the California court do not purport to
offer the broad type of education which is available at public and private
elementary and high schools, it surely cannot be claimed that they make
46
an equivalent fundamental and essential contribution to general welfare.
The admission that zoning ordinances may have an impact upon some
type of private institution does not force the conclusion that a court will
have the responsibility of prescribing a projected curriculum. It is generally
recognized that the legislature may determine the types of schools to be
established as public schools throughout the state, the content of their
curricula and the qualifications of their teachers. 47 The courts, when confronted with a zoning ordinance restriction, would merely have to ascertain
if the private school was recognized by the State Department of Instruction
as fulfilling the requirements of state law applicable to elementary and high
schools. This is nothing more than a court would be required to do in
respect to issues which could arise under compulsory attendance law.
The fear expressed by the Piedmont case dissenters that all the specially
mentioned schools would merely begin to introduce a few subjects which
are taught in elementary and high schools and thereby avoid zoning restrictions is quite unrealistic. Many of the schools simply would not want to
make such effort. They are commercial institutions that can prosper very
well in other than residential areas. Furthermore, the schools could not
conform to the law by simply introducing a few subjects. The state legislature has quite extensive power over the control of the curriculum 48 and over
44. Id. at 339, 289 P.2d at 446.
45. Id. at 339-40, 289 P.2d at 447.
46. A claim of equivalent contribution would be no more persuasive than the
effort in the Lutheran High School case to support the decision upon precedent which
involved facts concerning privately owned parks and playgrounds, a privately owned
golf driving range, and a wholesale and retail milk business.
47. Edwards op. cit. supra note 38, at 27-28 and cases cited therein.
48. Seitz, supra note 41.
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certification of teachers,4" who can instruct in public schools. The legislaturc can properly insist upon private schools meeting requirements of such
sort which are not unreasonable or arbitrary. The State Department of
Public Instruction can assist the courts in evaluating the extent of conformity to the law.
Conclusion
In a recent article on zoning, "Constitutional Law and Community
Planning,"' 0 it was pointed out that "the difficult question of the future
may grow out of the official action which . ..has discriminatory effects,
such as segregation of economic classes through zoning."
It is subnitted that the whole problem of zoning out of the private
school is of equal importance in our democracy.
In this country a public school system is one of our most important
and necessary institutions. It performs a service of high value. It is something that should be supported and further developed. But the position of
the private school must also be made secure.
There must be a proper recognition of the general welfare value of the
private school if we are to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights
and liberties of parents and of the private schools. There must be an appreciation of the role which the private school plays in checking any possible
trend toward standardization in education.A'
In order to properly safeguard the interests of parents and of the
private school there must be a realistic balancing of fundamental rights
against the self-interest of some property owners who may object to the
erection of a private school in their immediate neighborhood.
The whole problem of the zoning out of the private school is one of
utmost importance in our democracy.

49. On teacher certification generally, see

and Edwards, op. cit. supra note 38, at 440-46.
50. Johnson, supra note 7, at 200.
51.

JoHNsoN AND YOST

op.

REMMLEIN,

cit. supra note

SCHbOOL LAW 17-24 (1950)

27, at 140, quote P. P. Claxton,

former United States Commissioner of Education, as saying, "We believe inthe public
school system.
It is the salvation of our democracy; hut the private schools and
colleges have been the salvation of the public schools.' These private institutions have
their place in our educational system. They prevent it from becoming autocratic and

arbitrary, and encourage its growth along new lines."

